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Abstract 
After the last EU enlargement the problem of tax competition is more 
complex and this article tries to reflect the amplitude of this 
phenomenon. Some factors have a positive influence of tax competition 
and one of this is capital mobility, but others have a negative impact 
like public debt or budget deficit. Using a panel data for EU 
countries, analyzed on 1995-2004, we find significant correlations 
between the implicit tax rate of business income and corporation 
profits and the budget deficit, public debt, GDP per capita and the 
degree of openness of countries, the last variable is used as a proxy 
for capital mobility. The tax competition is specific only for direct 
taxation and for this reason we choose as dependent variables an 
indicator which is reflecting the effective tax burden on business 
income and corporations profits - the implicit tax rate of business 
income and corporations profits. 
The main conclusion is that every EU member states have a different 
degree of tax competition and this degree is limited by the EU requires 
concerning the budget deficit which have not exceed 3% of GDP and 60% 
for public debt. 
 
Keywords: tax competition, panel analysis, harmonization, tax burden 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union is the largest economic entity based on the union of 
27 states with an area of 4,422,773 km2. With more than 490 million 
inhabitants and a Gross Domestic Product of above EUR 11,500 billion1, 
the European Union is a major economic player in the world.  
 
After the last EU enlargement in 2007 the problem of tax competition is 
more complex and this article tries to reflect the amplitude of this 
phenomenon. Within the European Union space fiscal policy is situated 
at the border between harmonization and fiscal competition. 
 
Policy actions in corporate taxation at the EU level are 
relatively infrequent. This reflects both an institutional design 
that promotes subsidiarity in tax matters and rather ambiguous 
results on both the existence and the likely effects of corporate 
tax competition in Europe (Nicodeme, 2006). 
 
In now days the European Union is engaged in an intensified debate 
about international tax competition over capital income taxes. The 
controversy was determined by the series of competitive cuts in 
corporate income taxes that EU countries began to undertake shortly 
                                                 
1 www.wikipedia.com 
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after the implementation of the reforms enhancing financial market 
integration in the early 1980s.  
 
The first move was made by the United Kingdom with a cut of its 
corporate income tax rate from 52 to 35 percent, and since then 
other European countries have largely followed suit by lowering 
corporate tax rates and by adjusting other elements of their tax 
structure, like Ireland, for example, has cut its corporate tax 
rate down to 12.5%2 and some of ex-communist countries which have 
adopted a flat tax at very low level (Mendoza & Tesar, 2003, 
p.1). 
 
The supporters of harmonization consider that through harmonization is 
assuring the complete free of movements for capitals, goods, services 
and persons in European Union. The tax competition is criticized 
because is seen as a factor for tax base erosion in many countries, 
especially, in the old member states which have a high tax rate 
comparative with the new member states. But this argument is not 
sustained by the empirical studies; on the contrary in the long run 
time tax competition can determine an increasing of tax base because 
the reduction of tax rate let to the contributors more revenues which 
can be reinvested and more used efficient by the contributors 
comparative with the government.  
 
The opponents of tax competition are afraid that tax revenue will be 
decreasing and the welfare state it will be affected, but this 
phenomenon is possible to happen only on the short time because tax 
competition leads to an increasing of tax base in the long run time.  
 
Our study is based on the dual problem of tax competition – tax 
harmonization, which is the most controversial problem in the EU in now 
days. The harmonization is considered the optimal solution for tax 
policy in the EU, because through harmonization is assured the optimal 
level of tax revenues and the tax competition is seen harmful because 
determines a suboptimal level of public goods providing.  
 
The result of tax competition may well be a tendency towards less 
than efficient levels of output of local services. In attempting 
to keep taxes low to attract business investment, local official 
may hold spending below those levels for which marginal benefits 
equal marginal costs (Oates, 1972). 
 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The idea of tax competition is not new; it can be finding in the famous 
Wealth of Nations of Adam Smith. The debate on tax competition has 
started with the model developed by Tiebout (1956)3. The model examines 
competition among governments over mobile households and it is assumed 
that households select the region according to their preferences for 
the mix of taxes and public expenditures through voting with their 
feet. Tiebout argues that competition for mobile households is welfare 
                                                 
2 Mendoza, E. G., Tesar, L.L., 2003, “Winners and Losers of Tax Competition in the 
European Union”, Working Paper  10051, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10050 
3 Tiebout, C.,  1956,  „A Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures”, Journal of 
Political Economy 64, 416-24 
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enhancing. Integration of Europe follows the conclusions from Tiebout 
model applied at the government level, which are competing for capital 
and for firms. 
 
In the literature are many points of views that try to reveal the 
fiscal externality generated by tax competition through the race of the 
bottom in tax rate and underprovision of public goods in equilibrium 
like in basics models of tax competition developed by Zodrow & 
Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), and surveyed by Wilson (1999). 
 
This view is contrasting to the thinking of conservative policymakers 
and the Public Choice literature. Brennan and Buchanan (1980), or 
McLure (1986) have argued that competition in general, and competition 
among governments in particular, is beneficial because it reduces 
government waste and disciplines politicians.  
 
After ’90 many of the former communist economies adopt the idea of tax 
competition and a new model of tax competition is developed – the new 
geographical model - based on the idea that production concentration in 
some area leads to avoiding capital migration due to multiples rents 
can be obtained. The theory of geographical model of tax competition is 
developed by Ludema & Wooton (2000), followed by Andersson & Forslid 
(2003) and Baldwin & Krugman (2003). Krogstrup (2003), describes the 
important effects of agglomeration economies on tax competition through 
reducing the outflow of capital in the regions with so kind of 
economies. 
 
Policymakers tend to overspend and absorb government resources for 
their own objectives and without efficiency for citizens. While this 
view is more popular in the U.S. than in Europe, it is shared to some 
extent by those Europeans who are concerned about too much spending and 
waste of resources at the European Union level. 
 
If tax rates are cut in the process of competition, government 
expenditures have to be reduced; this helps to avoid waste and 
inefficiencies in the public sector. (Boss, 1999) 
  
We can conclude that literature is divided in two views on tax 
competition. There are the models where tax competition leads to 
inefficiently low taxes due to positive externalities, and reduces 
welfare, may support the notion that international cooperation between 
countries (i.e. like in the EU) can alleviate the downward pressure in 
tax rates and leave all countries better off. But there is also a whole 
group of models which reveal the positive effects of tax competition 
through reducing the inefficiency in government spending and stimulate 
the optimal ratio taxes-public goods for contributors which have the 
possibility to choose the jurisdiction which offer the best ratio.  
 
3. THEORETICAL BASIS  
 
Liberalization of foreign exchange laws, which accelerated in 1980s led 
to increased capital mobility and as a result increased competition 
between countries over capital. This result holds although governments 
act in the best interest of their countries. Thus, tax competition is 
harmful and some tax coordination among countries may improve welfare. 
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Tax competition is referring to fiscal policies operated in one country 
(using as mains instruments low tax rate but also some deductions or 
exemptions or even tax negotiating) which aimed for that country a 
competitive advantage in labor and capital attracting, and economic 
sustained growth.  
 
The most complete definition of tax competition is given by Wilson & 
Wildasin (2001), “as noncooperative tax setting by independent 
governments, under which each government's policy choices influence the 
allocation of a mobile tax base among regions, represented by these 
governments”.4 
 
Tax competition exists when governments are encouraged to lower fiscal 
burdens to either encourage the inflow of productive resources or 
discourage the exodus of those resources. Oftentimes, this means a 
governmental strategy of attracting foreign direct investment, foreign 
indirect investment (financial investment), and high value human 
resources by minimizing the overall taxation level and/or special tax 
preferences. Although often presented as a benefit for capital, tax 
competition is generally a central part of a government policy for 
improving the lot of labour by creating well-paid jobs.5 
 
Many countries begin to reformulates their fiscal policies for become 
more competitively. But not only the low tax rate can make a country 
more competitive, in now days another instrument seems to be more 
important and this is simplicity and operability of fiscal procedure 
with the reduction of bureaucracy.  
 
Due to different grade of mobility for production factors the tax 
competition is more pregnant in the case of capital income taxation, 
because the capital is the most mobile production factor. 
 
Tax competition describes a situation where the fiscal activities 
in one jurisdiction induce fiscal externalities in other 
jurisdictions (Winner, 2005). 
 
We consider that a definition for tax competition can be formulate 
thus: tax competition is a fiscal reaction mechanism, which take place 
between many states, mechanism which use as main instruments changes of 
tax rate or tax base, with the aim of attracting new capitals or labor 
forces, or as a direct answer to the same behavior from to another 
state trying to avoid capital or labor forces migration.  
 
Taking into account the field of manifestation we can distinguish 
between vertical tax competition (between the governments situated at 
different levels) and horizontal tax competition (between the 
governments situated at the same levels). 
 
4. METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
Using the panel methodology through a multiple regression with 
estimation by random effects we try to demonstrate some hypotheses that 
reveals the main arguments favorable for tax competition.  
 
                                                 
4 Wilson, J.D. and Wildasin, D.E., 2004, “Capital tax competition: bane or boon?” , Mimeo 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax_competition 
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Based on the hypotheses demonstrated in our model we can affirm that 
the best solution for European Union is harmonization for indirect 
taxes and competition for direct taxes. Tax competition is necessary in 
the future tax policy of EU as while as tax competition is under some 
macroeconomic constraints as budget deficit and public debt. We can 
appreciate that this constrains are more efficient than other solution 
for eliminating and combating so called harmful tax competition.  
 
Our analysis is for a period of ten years, based on annual data. The 
dependent variable is implicit tax rate on capital and business income. 
We introduce control variable - public expenditures as percentage of 
GDP. We estimate the impact of budget deficit and public debt on the 
tax burden of capital in a standard random effects model. This article 
analyzes 27 countries, EU members in the present, for 1995-2004 
periods. We have taking into consideration all 27 countries even in 
that period weren’t all EU members, but for our study is important 
especially for predicted what it would be in the future and taking into 
account the major differences between the old and the new member 
states. 
 
Our start point was the study of Winner (2005), which demonstrated some 
of these hypotheses for OECD countries (H1. Higher capital mobility 
leads to a lower tax burden on capital). 
 
We try to develop a specific model for EU taking into account the 
present day of EU countries, who are engaged in a race of tax 
competition under unequal starting conditions.  
 
Unequal conditions means that although all EMU and prospective 
EMU Member States have to satisfy the two conditions of the 
stability pact (i.e. public debt lower than 60% of GDP and budget 
deficit lower than 3% of GDP) they do not start from equal 
starting positions concerning public debt and budget deficit 
(Halkos & Kyriazis, 2006) 
 
Our motivation for this study was to confirm or not the impact of the 
two major constraints that have to accomplish EU members (3% for budget 
deficit and 60% for public debt as a ratio to GDP) on the degree of tax 
competition in which can be involved every EU member state. This idea 
it can be find at Halkos & Kyriazis (2006), but they are using game 
theory for demonstrate the limitation of tax competition under budget 
deficit and public debt in the EU countries. 
 
A major limit of this study is to find the proper variable which 
indicates the measure of tax competition. In this case are many 
solutions. Because there isn’t an indicator for tax competition we may 
consider the best measure for tax competition the evolution of tax 
burden. The tax burden also can be reveal using some indicators like – 
the statutory tax rate (but this rate is not so relevant because tax 
competition can use as instrument the changes in tax base without any 
change in tax rate).  
 
But we consider the better indicator for evaluating the tax burden, the 
effective tax rate, calculated as a ratio between the effective tax and 
the tax base. At the European Union level data about the effective tax 
rate are very scarcely and in this case we choose an Eurostat 
indicator: implicit tax rate an capital and business income calculated 
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as a ratio between the effective tax on capital and business income and 
the effective tax base, taking into account all deductions or 
exemptions.  
 
For our study is important to demonstrate four hypotheses to confirm or 
not the arguments in favor of tax competition:  
 
H1: Capital mobility is in favor of tax competition. 
H2: Budget deficit limit the degree of tax competition manifestation. 
H3: Public debt and public expenses are correlated with the degree of 
tax competition manifestation. 
H4: The most developed countries of European Union (the old members’ 
states) are engaged in a low degree in the process of tax competition, 
compared with the new member states, which have a much lower GDP per 
capita.  
 
Tabel 1. Estimation results from panel regression 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE:IMPLICIT TAX RATE ON 
CAPITAL AND BUSINESS INCOME 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 19.39 
(0.00) 
24.48 
(0.00) 
28.89 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.99) 
DB(Budget deficit) 0.31*** 
(0.00) 
0.23** 
(0.02) 
0.27** 
(0.01) 
0.61*** 
(0.000) 
DP(Public debt)  -0.06*** 
(0.005) 
-0.06** 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.001) 
PIBLOC (GDP per capita)  0.26*** 
(0.00) 
0.23** 
(0.01) 
-0.14 
(0.30) 
DESCH (Openness)  -0.06*** 
(0.000) 
-0.06*** 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
INF (Inflation)    -0.05 
(0.29) 
POP (Population)    0.16 
(0.55) 
UES (Country area as 
percentage of EU area) 
    -0.22 
(0.53) 
0.43 
(0.79) 
EXCH (Exchange rate)    -0.001 
(0.21) 
CONSPIB(Consumption as 
percentage of GDP) 
  -0.05 
(0.64) 
-0.06 
(0.67) 
GUVPIB(Government 
expenses as percentage 
of GDP) 
   -0.08 
(0.72) 
IPIB (Investments as 
percentage of GDP) 
   0.17 
(0.25) 
CREC (Economic Growth 
Rate) 
  -0.10 
(0.37) 
-0.02 
(0.87) 
CHPUBPIB (Public 
expenses % of GDP) 
   0.62*** 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 212 203 203 170 
R2 0,78 0,81 0,81 0,85 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis. ∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 
10%; 
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Tabel 2. Synthesis of independent variables 
VARIABLES EXPLICATIONS SOURCE 
DB Budget deficit As a percentage of GDP is the main 
constraint in front of tax 
competition. 
Eurostat 
DP Public debt For covering the budget deficit 
every country has two main 
solutions: raising the taxation or 
rising debt ratio. If the debt ratio 
is increase we are expected to have 
a lower taxation on the short time 
but in the long time the public debt 
it will be covered from rising 
taxation, and we can say that public 
debt is a delayed tax for 
contributors. 
Eurostat 
PIBLOC GDP per Capita It is an important difference 
between the old member states which 
have a high GDP per capita 
comparative with the new member and 
we expect to obtain some correlation 
between this variable and evolution 
of tax burden, implicitly the 
manifestation of tax competition.  
PWT (Penn 
World 
Table) 
INF Inflation  Eurostat 
POP Population Population of every member states as 
percentage of total EU population. 
PWT  
UES Country area Area of every member states as 
percentage of total EU area. 
Wikipedia 
EXCH Exchange rate For every national currency 
comparative with US $. 
PWT  
CONSPIB Consumption as 
percentage of 
GDP 
 PWT  
GUVPIB Government 
expenses as 
percentage of 
GDP 
This variable has influence on the 
total tax burden.  
PWT  
IPIB Investments as 
percentage of 
GDP 
 PWT  
DESCH Openness Openness is used as a proxy for 
capital mobility, the main factor 
which is favorable for tax 
competition. Is calculated as a 
ratio between the sum of imports and 
exports to GDP. 
PWT  
CREC Economic Growth 
Rate 
 PWT  
CHPUBPIB Public expenses 
as percentage 
of GDP 
 Eurostat 
 
Equations used in our model are presented below: 
(1) RIIKit=c0+c1DB 
(2) RIIKit=c0+c1DB+c2DP+c3PIBLOC+c4DESCH  
(3) RIIKit=c0+c1DB+c2DP+c3PIBLOC+c4DESCH+c5UES+c6CONSPIB+c7CREC 
(4) RIIKit=c0+c1DP+c2PIBLOC+c3DESCH+c4INF+c5POP+c6UES+c7EXCH+ 
    +c8CONSPIB+c9GUBPIB+c10IPIB+c11CREC+c12CHPUBPIB 
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The starting equation (1)reveal the correlation between the dependent 
variable and the budget deficit and as we can see from the Table 1, the 
correlation is robustness and the independent variable is significant, 
but this is not the only variables which have influence of the tax 
competition. In the next equations we added more variables and for 
every variable we have been explicitly the result in the Table 3. 
 
Tabel 3. Interpretation of model results 
VARIABLES 
Budget deficit Is the most significant variable and is direct 
correlated with the implicit tax rate and also with the 
tax competition. If one country have a high budget 
deficit, which is bigger than 3% from GDP it is very 
difficult for that country to engage in the tax 
competition race. One unit change in budget deficit is 
follow by 0.31 unit change in the same direction of 
implicit tax rate on capital and business income (from 
the first equation).  
Public debt It is a significant variable but the correlation is not 
so powerful like with budget deficit and the 
correlation is indirect because in most of the cases 
the budget deficit is covered by public debt and only 
after that by rising taxes. When taxes raising the 
public debt are lower and vice versa. From our study we 
can see that for countries like Italy, Greece, Belgium 
is difficult to engage in the tax competition because 
the level of their public debt is double for the level 
required by the EU.  
GDP per Capita It is significant variable only in the first three 
equations, the correlation is direct, and this confirm 
that we can see from descriptive analysis that the new 
members state which have a lower GDP per capita are 
more engaged in the tax competition comparative with 
the old members states (EU 15).  
Inflation It is not a significant variable but the correlation 
(even it is not relevant the result) is indirect that 
means that countries with the high inflation have are 
more engaged in the tax competition race. 
Population There is a weak and direct correlation; the large 
countries have high taxation than small countries.  
Country area The same situation like for the Population variable.  
Exchange rate Insignificant correlation. 
Openness This variable is significant correlated with tax 
competition because is a proxy for capital mobility 
which is an important factor in tax competition 
developing. If the capital mobility is very high there 
is the possibility to choose the jurisdiction with a 
lower taxation and this lead to reduce tax burden 
through tax competition.  
Public expenses 
as percentage of 
GDP 
Direct correlation and very strong, a low level a 
public expenses allow a lower taxation and this give 
the possibility for a country to be engaged in tax 
competition.  
Note: The others variables (Consumption as percentage of GDP, Government expenses as 
percentage of GDP, Investments as percentage of GDP, Economic Growth Rate)    have an 
insignificant correlation 
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From this empirical study we may conclude that the future of EU tax 
policy is based not only tax harmonization, but also on tax 
competition. The fight for combating the harmful tax competition is 
welcome but has to be done with the proper instruments and we consider 
that the satisfying the two conditions of the stability pact (i.e. 
public debt lower than 60% of GDP and budget deficit lower than 3% of 
GDP)are the best instruments for limiting the harmful tax competition. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Our empirical analysis is sustained by descriptive analysis. In the 
next figure we try to reflect the model correlation between corporate 
tax rate for 2007 and the main constraints for tax competition: budget 
deficit and public debt (dates for this are considered for 2006). We’ve 
been considered budget deficit and public debt for 2006 because the 
impact on corporate tax rate for the next year is more robust.  
   
Figure 1 Correlation between statutory corporate tax rate and budget 
deficit and public debt. 
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From the figure above we can see that countries like Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Romania accomplish the constraints concerning the 
level of budget deficit and public debt and this allow them to imply in 
the tax competition race through lower tax rate on capital, especially 
on corporate profits. In the opposite side are countries like Belgium, 
Greece, Italy or Hungary with a very high level for public debt and for 
budget deficit. 
 
Also we’ve been analyzed the evolution of statutory corporate tax rate 
for EU countries between 2007-1995 and as we can see from Figure 2 
there are important changes. Bulgaria and Ireland have registered the 
most important reductions almost 30 percentage points, followed by 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia with more than 20 percentage points 
reduction. Only Finland has increased their tax rate but only 1 
percentage point. 
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Tabel 4. Statutory tax rate on corporate income 1995-2007, in % 
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007-
1995 
BE 40,2 40,2 40,2 40,2 34 34 34 34 34 -6,2 
BG 40 32,5 28 23,5 23,5 20 15 15 10 -30 
CZ 41 31 31 31 31 28 26 24 24 -17 
DK 34 32 30 30 30 30 28 28 28 -6 
DE 56,8 51,6 38,3 38,3 39,6 38,3 38,7 38,7 38,7 -18,1 
EE 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 23 22 -4 
IE 40 24 20 16 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 12,5 -27,5 
EL 40 40 37,5 35 35 35 32 29 25 -15 
ES 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 32,5 -2,5 
FR 36,7 37,8 36,4 35,4 35,4 35,4 35 34,4 34,4 -2,2 
IT 52,2 41,3 40,3 40,3 38,3 37,3 37,3 37,3 37,3 -15 
CY 25 29 28 28 15 15 10 10 10 -15 
LV 25 25 25 22 19 15 15 15 15 -10 
LT 29 24 24 15 15 15 15 19 18 -11 
LU 40,9 37,5 37,5 30,4 30,4 30,4 30,4 29,6 29,6 -11,3 
HU 19,6 19,6 19,6 19,6 19,6 17,6 17,5 17,5 18,6 -1,1 
MT 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 0 
NL 35 35 35 34,5 34,5 34,5 31,5 29,6 25,5 -9,5 
AT 34 34 34 34 34 34 25 25 25 -9 
PL 40 30 28 28 27 19 19 19 19 -21 
PT 39,6 35,2 35,2 33 33 27,5 27,5 27,5 26,5 -13,1 
RO 38 25 25 25 25 25 16 16 16 -22 
SI 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 23 -2 
SK 40 29 29 25 25 19 19 19 19 -21 
FI 25 29 29 29 29 29 26 26 26 1 
SE 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 0 
UK 33 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 -3 
NO 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 0 
EU27 35,3 31,9 30,7 29,3 28,3 27,1 25,5 25,3 24,5 -10,8 
EU25 35 32,2 31,1 29,7 28,7 27,4 26,3 26 25,5 -9,6 
EA13 38,5 35,8 34,1 32,8 32 31,4 30 29,5 28,5 -10 
NMS 
12 32,0 30,5 27,6 27,0 25,3 23,8 21,6 19,7 19,8 19,1 
      Source: Eurostat 
 
The higher statutory corporate tax rate can be find in Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Spain, France, Malta, where is above 30% and in the opposite 
side with the lower corporate tax rate are countries like Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Romania, with rates between 10 and 16 %. As we can see 
from the Table 4 in EU 27 the average statutory tax rate is higher with 
5 percentage points comparative with the new member states NMS 12.   
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Figure 2. The statutory corporate tax reduction 2007-1995 in EU 
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The Figure 3 reflect the decline trend of corporate tax rate 
comparative for EU members and for NMS 12 (new member states) the 
decline is more pregnant almost 13 percentage points comparative with 
the Euro area where is almost 10 percentage points.  
 
Figure 3.  Evolution of Corporate Tax Rate (calculated as average) 
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Source: authors calculations based on Eurostat 
 
The most important measure to eliminate the diversity of company 
taxation in the EU (which causes several distortions and obstacles for 
the cross-border business activities) is introducing a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) for the EU-wide activities of 
multinationals until the end of 2008. The minimum degree is a 
harmonized tax base which should be based on a single set of tax 
accounting principles using the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as a starting point.  
 
If a common European tax base is introduced, common standards for 
loss offset will be necessary. As a general rule, accounting for 
potential losses should be the more liberal; the greater 
limitations in the field of inter-period loss compensation exist 
The analysis shows that IFRS could provide elements of a common 
and harmonized European tax base in certain areas like 
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recognition of assets and liabilities, the determination of cost 
values, amortization, impairment and treatment of onerous 
contracts. (Oestreicher & Spengel, 2007, p. 28, p.39) 
The CCCTB would contribute to greater efficiency, effectiveness, 
simplicity and transparency in company tax systems and should be based 
on International Accounting Standards and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS).  
6. Conclusions 
 
Taxes on capital should vanish in a world of increasing capital 
mobility or tend to be reduced to zero by national governments acting 
independently of one another. This is perhaps the most often result of 
standard tax competition theory. Further, tax competition should induce 
a shift of tax burden from mobile capital to immobile tax bases, 
especially labor. 
 
Due to a “race to the bottom” taxes on capital income might no longer 
contribute sufficiently to the financing of public expenditure and it 
might become difficult or even impossible for governments to perform 
their usual tasks. An under supply of public goods and/or an erosion of 
the welfare state are feared to be the outcome of tax competition. At 
the very least, the tax burden might be shifted away from highly mobile 
capital towards immobile factors such as labour; this would raise 
labour costs and impede the reduction of unemployment especially in 
Western Europe. The harmonization of tax rates is thought to be the 
remedy at least for indirect taxes. 
 
The opponents of tax competitions argues that this mechanism leads to a 
“race to the bottom” in corporate tax rate and other capital tax, but 
from the empirical model presented here results that this race to the 
bottom is not so easily to realized because of the two major 
constraints for EU member states: 3% budget deficit and 60% public debt 
from GDP. The conditions for competitors are not equal and the 
competition is not taking place in a perfect market. Only the tax 
competition in the perfect market can lead to disappearing of capital 
taxation under perfect mobility as predicted by the standard tax 
competition model. 
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